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2.1 Introduction
Stephan, Marshall, and McGinnis observed: ‘Polanyi focused on polycen-
tricity as a form of emergent order, in the sense that a complex system of
component parts may exhibit regularized patterns which are only apparent
if one looks at the system as a whole.’ This chapter deals with identifying
regularized patterns in complex governance situations and, more specific-
ally, with what it means to examine those situations by thinking about
them as potentially polycentric. We call this approach ‘seeing
polycentrically’.
A multitude of governance types qualify as polycentric. In this chapter
we consider polycentricity as a particular lens through which to view
governance arrangements. Given the ubiquity of governance arrangements
involving multiple semi-autonomous but functionally interdependent
actors, we believe it to be important to consider how thinking polycen-
trically might help in understanding and evaluating how they interact and
perform.
The chapter proceeds as an inquiry. There is no classic or ideal type of
polycentric governance, and polycentric order generally emerges rather
than being planned using an a priori design. The analysis of how and in
what ways a particular governance situation is polycentric, therefore
should not be conducted deductively by starting with a model of a poly-
centric governance system and then determining how closely the situation
under scrutiny fits the model. To some extent, developing an understand-
ing of emergent situations needs to be emergent also.
An inquiry-based approach can be conducted as a kind of diagnostic
assessment, guided by questions that draw out information that can be
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used to develop an overall depiction of the situation.1 The results
from such an inquiry may also be useful in analysing the governance
arrangements and contemplating modifications to them, as discussed in
Chapter 11. The definitions and dimensions of polycentric governance
presented in Chapter 1 can aid in identifying and organizing the inquiry
one would undertake.2
In what follows, we imagine that one has come across a complex
situation involving multiple centres of decision making, and then works
through an inquiry process by which one might determine the extent to
which that situation resembles polycentric governance. More directly, we
would say that upon encountering any multi-organizational governance
structure, an analyst needs to consider whether it is a polycentric govern-
ance arrangement or a fragmented and uncoordinated, polycentric mess.3
We present and discuss a sequence of questions that an observer can ask
before reaching conclusions about the nature, operation, and effects of
complex governing arrangements. The order of the topics and the
sequence of questions have been considered carefully and adjusted from
time to time during the drafting of this chapter, and we recognize that the
questions are so interrelated that the answer to one question will entail or
pre-empt others. This will not always or necessarily be the case, however,
so the questions still need to be identified separately so they can be
addressed as needed or relevant. In each of the six following sections of
the chapter, the reader will find a set of questions grouped by topic; the
questions are listed together at the beginning of each section and then
discussed.
2.2 Questions about the Centres Themselves
 What centres influence the governed good/service/resource?
 What are their functions?
○ Do larger centres perform functions or provide services that are
beneficial for smaller centres, or vice versa?
○ Are some centres primarily provision units and others primarily
production units?
1 For recent examples of inquiry-based approaches to analysing complex governance
situations, see Buytaert et al. (2016), Kerber (2017), and Kiparsky et al. (2017).
2 We are setting aside the topic of research methods, i.e., the means by which an analyst
might collect and analyse data on these inquiries.
3 Of course, these are not the only options and may instead be seen as poles of a spectrum
along which actual governance arrangements lie.
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○ Are functions concentrated in a few centres or widely spread
among centres?
○ What rationales underlie functional separation and functional inte-
gration among centres?
 Do the centres operate at different scales or levels?
 Is there actual duplication among the centres, and to what extent?
○ Are they identical, i.e. doing the same things in the same way?
○ Do centres that do the same things serve differing areas or
clienteles?
 Is there overlap?
○ Do centres do some of the same things but not all of the same
things?
○ Do centres overlap in affecting the good/service/resource but do
very different things?
○ To the extent there is overlap, does there appear to be any rationale
for it?
 Is there redundancy in the sense of a default actor in case another
centre fails or ceases to act?
○ Where there is actual duplication, does it appear to be entirely
needless or does it serve as potentially useful redundancy?
○ Do centres have overlapping authority or responsibilities formally
but not necessarily in practice?
One’s first impression of polycentricity may be of multiple identical
centres. A polycentric structure composed of matching organizations is
imaginable, but seems inconsistent with (a) processes of design, spontan-
eity, and emergence involving (b) intendedly albeit boundedly rational
individuals, capable of engaging in (c) multiple levels of action. It is unclear
why or how people would create and maintain copies of the same centres,
despite being able to adapt them over time or eliminate them, or how and
why any spontaneous or emergent processes of organizational creation and
adaptation would produce and keep producing identical organizations.
Organizational diversity is a foundational concept for understanding
polycentric governance. Instead of presuming or anticipating a set of
replicas performing the same functions and operating identically, poly-
centric governance presumes and anticipates that the centres are differen-
tiated. Empirical studies of polycentric structures, as well as theoretical
explorations of why and how such structures would come into existence
and persist over time, converge to a common view, namely, that most (and
perhaps all) actual polycentric arrangements are comprised of distinct
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units operating at different levels and/or performing different functions.
Visualizing the polycentric governance of a region, for instance, Elinor
Ostrom (2009, 753) wrote:
In a polycentric system, some units are general-purpose governments, whereas
others may be highly specialized. Self-organized resource governance systems, in
such a system, may be special districts, private associations, or parts of a local
government. These can be nested in several levels of general-purpose governments
that also provide civil equity, as well as criminal courts.
Governance functions may be distributed among centres, and if so, it
can be important to inquire whether there have been reasons for arranging
governance responsibilities in this fashion. For instance, one or more
centres may be charged with regulating the activities of others, so that
centres which provide goods and services are not policing themselves. The
literature on local public economies (which are examples of polycentric
arrangements) has emphasized the distinction between provision and
production functions – provision decisions involving what goods or ser-
vices to acquire, in what amounts and with what quality, how to pay for
them, etc., and production functions being the actual transformation of
inputs into the outputs that are those goods or services (Oakerson 1999;
United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
1987). This distinction may help an analyst to begin to sort through the
centres that are present in a complex situation to see whether some of them
are provision units and others are production units.
Centres performing production functions may have different require-
ments and constraints. Roe and Schulman (2008) introduced the concept
of ‘high reliability organizations’, meaning those that produce goods or
services for which even slight deviations or errors may have disastrous
consequences. This idea may help an analyst to make sense of the differ-
entiation of functions across centres even when, at first glance, they are
production units involved in ‘the same’ good or service or resource. On a
given stream or lake, for instance, production of drinking water for public
consumption may be an example of a ‘high reliability’ task, where treat-
ment and distribution processes have to be executed the same way every
time with minimal to no error, because any slippage could result in a
public health epidemic, and any process changes have to be introduced
carefully after extensive testing. Alternatively, the operation of facilities
that manage stream flows or lake levels may be conducted within accept-
able ranges, and might even be experimented with under limited condi-
tions as part of an adaptive management approach. A complex governance
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situation within which high-reliability tasks are distributed to one centre
and more flexible and adaptive tasks to other centres may make sense if
personnel needs, operating procedures, and performance standards differ
in important ways from task to task.
It may be, and often is, the case that centres exist and operate at different
levels (often referred to as ‘scales’ in the literature, although we follow the
distinction of levels and scales used in Chapter 1). This observation does
not assume and should not be confused with a claim that polycentric
arrangements naturally or inevitably take advantage of scale efficiencies
or result in appropriate matching of levels. Mismatches and inefficiencies
are possible as well.
There are several ways in which levels and scales may come into play.
One way is through the idea of scale of production. Conceptually at least,
any good or service can be produced at levels ranging from individual to
global. We can readily anticipate and observe that diverse levels of produc-
tion will come into existence, whether through deliberate choice, trial-and-
error adaptation, or sheer happenstance. To the extent that diversity of
levels of production translates into the creation of multiple producer
organizations, it is one source of polycentricity as organizations take others
into account.
Scale of effects is conceptually distinct from scale of production,
although as a practical matter they are often connected. Scale of effects
involves the question of who benefits from or is otherwise affected by some
good or service (compare with the concept of externalities, e.g. Bromley
1989). Scale of production and scale of effects do not have to match. The
set of human or other beings who are affected – positively, negatively, or
some combination of both – by any good or service may also range from
very small to global levels. Impacts may be substantial or attenuated, and
indeed, what it means to be ‘affected’ at all by any phenomenon is
constructed and contestable. The inclusion of positive or negative
externalities adds further complexity to an arrangement in ways that often
give rise to felt needs for regulation and/or conflict resolution. As people
organize processes and structures for demand articulation, demand aggre-
gation, cost allocation, regulation, and conflict resolution, we can readily
anticipate and often observe that those entities will exist at various levels
corresponding not only with characteristics of the goods and services in
question, but also characteristics of the communities that are perceived to
be affected.
Organizationally diverse arrangements may exhibit duplication, overlap
and redundancy. This is important to the understanding and analysis of
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polycentric arrangements, in ways that go beyond normative judgements.
Analysts sometimes use these terms interchangeably, or use one term when
one of the others would be more accurate. There are important differences
among the three, but our purpose is not to parse the terms. Instead, we are
interested in how all three are connected with understanding polycentric
governance.
All three terms have had negative connotations and have been used in
critiques of multi-organizational settings. Viewed from the perspective of a
Weberian ideal type of organization, all three characteristics are problem-
atic and should be targeted for elimination. Rhetorically, just to apply the
words duplication, overlap, or redundancy to a situation is to indict it as
deficient and inefficient without any need for further inquiry.
Other scholars, however, have discovered some virtues in duplication,
overlap and redundancy. Martin Landau’s defence of redundancy (1969,
1973) is especially notable in this literature. He emphasized the value of
back-up systems in complex structures to reduce their fragility and vulner-
ability, and his arguments became a building block of later work on
robustness and resilience. Also during the 1960s and 1970s, in their studies
of water resource management and of public service delivery in metropol-
itan areas and federal systems, both Vincent and Elinor Ostrom presented
theoretical arguments and empirical support for arrangements that others
had assailed for duplication and overlap. (Both often cited Landau, also.)
They repeatedly connected duplication and overlap with the importance of
contestation through the existence of overlapping forums for conflict
resolution and the enforcement of rules guarding dissent and diversity
(e.g. E. Ostrom 2009, 753). Another important thread of supporting
argumentation is seen in the work of public administration scholars such
as Peters (2015, 129) who have emphasized the importance of multiple
channels of information and communication in complex and multi-
organizational structures (see also Buytaert et al. 2016, 3).
One need not take sides among these contesting views in order to
incorporate and apply the concepts of duplication, overlap, and redun-
dancy in the effort to understand polycentric governance. Rather, one can
recognize that (a) these characteristics are typically present in polycentric
arrangements, (b) their presence is a matter of degree, such that there may
be greater or lesser amounts of duplication, overlap, and/or redundancy in
a particular setting, and (c) whether the duplication, overlap, and redun-
dancy that are present have net positive or negative effects is an empirical
question, the answer to which will depend on both the situation and the
evaluative criteria the analyst applies.
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2.3 Questions about the Social Problem Characteristics
 What biophysical characteristics of the problem/good/service/
resource affect how the governance arrangement functions?
 Are there multiple possibilities to fulfil the function of the problem/
good/service/resource that people are trying to address, and, if so,
how does the multiplicity of decision-making centres align with those
possibilities?
 How are characteristics of the problem/good/service/resource that
people are trying to address multi-functional?
○ Is the problem/ good/ service/ resource used or valued in more than
one way?
○ Do the multiple decision centres correspond with these multiple
functions/uses/values?
 Are multiple scales of the problem/good/service/resource conceivable,
such that it can be governed at smaller or larger scales and by lower or
higher levels?
○ Do scale differences of centres appear to correspond in
some manner with relevant differences in social problem
characteristics?
○ Do scale differences of centres capture scales of production or
scales of effects and, if so, in what ways?
The structure and functioning of governance arrangements strongly
relates to the characteristics of social problems/goods/services/resources
addressed, people’s knowledge about those characteristics, and differing
perceptions of them. This is an important focus of Chapter 3. The problem
characteristics may change over time, and the knowledge and perceptions
about them may change even more or faster. It is likely that governance
arrangements reflect these processes and exhibit a multiplicity of settings
with centres corresponding with different scales, levels, functional alterna-
tives, as well as with the multifunctionality of a problem/good/service/
resource. The plurality of possibilities to fulfil a function is a source for the
variety of polycentric governance arrangements. For example, the function
of producing drinking water may be fulfilled by using local groundwater
resources, treating surface waters, transporting bottled water from a dis-
tance, etc. Governance arrangements might involve one or several of these
possibilities in varying combinations, and one or more centres may come
into being to pursue these possibilities separately or in a coordinated
manner.
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When dealing with complex and differently defined social problems, we
should not expect a set of diverse and formally independent yet function-
ally interdependent centres to be harmonious. As Cash et al. (2006)
observed, ‘Knowledge is often held, stored, and perceived differently at
different levels, resulting from differences across levels about what is
perceived as salient, credible, and legitimate knowledge, or what is per-
ceived as the important scale or level of the problem.’ They referred to this
as ‘the plurality challenge’.
Differences in information and interpretations of information can and
should generate some exchange, and this exchange is what we call contest-
ation. The term is broader than the simpler ‘conflict’, and therefore
preferable for our purposes here. (Chapter 6 focuses more directly on
conflict between centres.) Contestation over differences in information or
interpretations can be illuminating and can generate ideas and insights. It
can also deteriorate into mere rebuttal, refutation, and rejection. What
transpires in actual settings with respect to information and contestation is
an empirical question. The variety of information at work in polycentric
arrangements, and contestation among centres over its meaning and
significance, may lead to positive or negative outcomes or a combination
of both. The presence and patterns of information and contestation about
the social problem, but also about governing processes are essential char-
acteristics to be examined and assessed in any polycentric arrangement.
Recent emphasis on adaptive management and collaborative governance
should sharpen scholars’ focus on the vital roles of information generation,
exchange, and interpretation for understanding polycentric governance.
The goods and services that people produce and enjoy, the natural
resources they value and with which they interact, and many other aspects
of their environments are multi-functional. Very few if any phenomena of
significant interest to us (including human beings) are just one thing or
have just one aspect. As Norberg and Cumming (2008, 9) observed:
Each individual component of a complex system may have many properties and
many functions; for example, an antelope is simultaneously a grazer, a food source,
a disperser of nutrients, and a producer of methane. Any component of a complex
system may have properties that are redundant (i.e. that are duplicated by other
system components) and others that add diversity to the system.
A watercourse may be regarded and valued as an aesthetic treasure, a
conduit for navigation, a source of drinking water, of hydropower, of waste
disposal, of spiritual renewal, of recreation, of irrigation, and so on, as well
as a habitat for a variety of plants and animals. Furthermore, each of these
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uses and their effects may be experienced and governed by different but
overlapping groups over different areas.
From a prescriptive perspective, multifunctionality may be the basis of
arguments for a single integrated centre to govern and manage the water-
course in its entirety and for all uses and all users. Empirical observation
has tended to reveal the opposite, however. More commonly, people have
established multiple overlapping centres, organized around particular
groups or areas and focused on certain functions or values of the resource
(Boelens, Zwarteveen, and Roth 2005; Kerr 2007; Lankford and Hepworth
2010). Such arrangements are a principal source of the overlap that occurs
in polycentric governance arrangements. Whether they function well or
poorly is an open question to be addressed.
The concept of scale, already discussed, has further relevance here to the
existence of polycentric arrangements for the governance and management
of natural resources. Natural resources tend to be interconnected, nested,
and overlapping. At a broad and relatively abstract dimension, ecosystems
and habitats illustrate this point. Ecosystems may contain habitats, but a
habitat is not necessarily confined within a single ecosystem. Within a
habitat we might identify critical zones (e.g. nesting grounds, spawning
areas). The contours of those zones may change over time, as do the extent
of habitats and ecosystems. We could go on, but the theoretical and
analytical significance of this point for understanding polycentric arrange-
ments can be stated directly. Natural resources exist at multiple scales and
are impacted by dynamics occurring at and across multiple scales. Whether
human beings are trying to exploit, preserve, or recover natural resources –
and especially when human beings are trying to perform some combin-
ation of these, as is often the case – it is likely that they will organize
decision making and action in multiple, overlapping centres along different
scales. Inquiring about the connections between the centres in a complex
governance situation and the scales and functions of a good or service is an
important step in attempting to understand it from the viewpoint of
polycentricity.
2.4 Questions about Independence and Interdependence
among Centres
 How independent are the centres in their decision making?
○ To what extent and in what ways do they control their own
resources (funding, personnel, etc.)?
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○ What kind of questions may centres autonomously decide on, i.e.
what range of discretion do they have?
○ To what extent and in what ways are they able to reach their goals
on their own?
 What forms do relationships among the centres take?
○ Are there formalized relationships such as contracts between
centres, membership of one or more centres in another centre, etc.?
○ Are there informal forms such as interpersonal relationships, over-
lapping members or constituents, etc.?
○ Are some centres nested within others and, if so, in what ways, and
for what apparent reasons?
○ Are some centres in competitive relationships to each other and, if
so, in what ways? Does competition generate any useful informa-
tion or choices and, if so, for whom and in what ways?
A diverse set of units would not necessarily constitute a polycentric
structure. If a single authority can create and eliminate each unit, establish
every unit’s structure and define the scope and processes of its operation,
which the units themselves possessed no discretion to change, such an
arrangement would be more nearly monocentric than polycentric. In
polycentric arrangements, the centres exhibit at least some independence
or autonomy. The centres can to a greater or lesser degree adopt and alter
their functions and processes. The use of qualifying expressions such as ‘at
least some’ and ‘to a greater or lesser degree’ is deliberate – independence
does not have to be total and usually will not be.
The other side of the coin is the interdependence of decision-making
centres – various relationships among centres that constrain their inde-
pendence. Biophysical characteristics of a problem/good/service/
resource may relate centres to each other, but centres are also socially
embedded and sometimes institutionally interconnected, generating
additional interdependencies. This idea is picked up, for instance, by
the literature on cross-scale and cross-level linkages (see Adger, Brown,
and Tompkins 2005; Berkes 2006). The conceptions of those linkages
range from broad characterizations of ‘institutional interplay’ among
centres to more intentional ‘co-management’ and concrete ‘bridging
organizations’ that are created to forge and maintain relationships
among centres.
As stated in Chapter 1 and elaborated further in Chapter 3, as well as in
Chapters 9 and 10, the idea of an ‘overarching set of rules’ appears in
several important definitions of polycentricity. In actual settings, such rules
54 William A. Blomquist and Nadine Jenny Shirin Schröder
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108325721.003
may be expected to place some limits on what centres can do and in what
ways. This may encompass formal and informal rules giving some sort of
order between centres (E. Ostrom 1983). However, contesting rules might
also create conflicts e.g. through institutional interplay (Young 2002).
Some rules may apply to the whole arrangement, others only to parts of
it, e.g. rules within a hierarchy. A hierarchical structure may have elements
that can be considered as separate decision-making centres if they exhibit
at least some independence in decision making from the higher level.
Relationships between centres may also be shaped informally through
activities and memberships of individuals. Those information relationships
might change faster than an overarching rule system and can be hard to
control endogenously and exogenously. They offer the chance to find
governance solutions based on personal trust and to exchange information,
but may also be sources of additional conflicts (E. Ostrom1986).
Competition may be inherent to all kinds of relationships mentioned. It
is a common feature of polycentric arrangements, and is the focus of
Chapter 7. Relationships between centres in polycentric governance
arrangements will feature various combinations of competition and coord-
ination at a given time, over time, and from one polycentric governance
arrangement to another. The question for scholars then becomes how to
incorporate the concept of competition into their analyses of polycentric
governance. Part of the answer lies in considering what the centres may be
competing for or about, and there is a broad range of possibilities.
Centres may compete with one another for power and influence, for
more material matters such as revenue or territory or personnel, or even
for constituents. In polycentric governance, some centres may function as
producers of public goods or services and thus may compete in ways
similar to rival producers in market-like settings (e.g. Bendor 1985; Tieb-
out 1956). They may be imagined also as nations or states competing on
the international stage, or as agencies competing for control over policy
making. Any number of analogies is possible and, for a given governance
situation, some will be more apt and useful than others.
The effects that competition produces in any governance situation are
both contingent and a matter for empirical inquiry. It may yield benefits –
competition is often said to generate information and innovation, for
example (Low, E. Ostrom, and Wilson 2003, 101; Vanberg and Kerber
1994, 216). It may be detrimental, as in the often-remarked ‘race to the
bottom’ phenomenon (e.g. Konisky 2007). In complex actual settings, both
benefits and drawbacks are likely to be observed, and discerning the overall
effect becomes a challenging evaluation task.
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We need not, however, consider competition and its effects solely from
the perspective of the outside analyst observing and evaluating a poly-
centric governance arrangement. Competition among centres will be
experienced and evaluated by the participants themselves. Accordingly,
competition can also be incorporated into our analyses and understanding
of polycentric arrangements as an endogenous driver of change. People
may respond to competition by creating or modifying or eliminating
centres, changing their operations, or shifting levels of action and altering
the rules governing centres and their interaction. Competition and the
setting of other relationships are therefore also essential for understanding
polycentric arrangements and how they change over time.
2.5 Questions about Coordination
 Are there identifiable ways in which centres coordinate?
○ Do they share information and, if so, about what and in
what ways?
○ Do they collaborate on projects/programs/activities and, if so, in
what ways?
○ Do they share or exchange resources such as funding, personnel,
facilities, etc., and, if so, in what ways?
○ Do they appear to coordinate their respective functions, i.e. to
identify and to some extent agree upon which centres may/must/
must not do what and under which circumstances?
○ Do centres at different levels coordinate with each other?
 Are there decision centres working at more than one level of the
problem/ good/ service/ resource and, what is the rationale for that
and how does it affect coordination and conflicts?
 How have conflicts among centres arisen and been addressed?
○ Have conflicts had only negative impacts, or have they reflected
potentially useful contestation about alternative perspectives or
values?
○ Are there centres that perform conflict-resolution functions and, if
so, in what ways or under what conditions?
○ Can individuals or centres challenge a decision or action that was
taken at another level?
How centres take each other into account may derive to some degree
from their use and pursuit of information in relation to problems, goals,
strategies, and outcomes (see Chapters 5–8 in Part II). Interactions
56 William A. Blomquist and Nadine Jenny Shirin Schröder
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108325721.003
among centres may become cooperative, competitive and, to greater or
lesser extents coordinated, depending on complementarities or incompat-
ibilities in the information they generate, exchange, withhold, and use and
in how they interpret and understand it. In addition to competition, as
discussed, coordination is a way that centres ‘take each other into account’.
Each centre does not have to coordinate with all the others in order to
constitute a polycentric arrangement, but a collection of centres that was
devoid of coordination would not be a polycentric governance
arrangement.
Searching for, characterizing, and assessing the coordination occurring
in a polycentric governance situation is important but not simple. Coord-
ination can appear in many forms. There are formal types of coordination,
such as approval processes, and informal ones, such as consultation among
peers. Coordination may be mandated (even legislatively; see Schafer 2016)
or voluntary. It may be institutionalized in associations, task forces,
working groups, and the like. The variety is immense, and the specific
manifestations so diverse that Peters (2015, 128) has observed, ‘although
we certainly know coordination when we see it, measuring that coordin-
ation in other than a qualitative sense is at present difficult if not impos-
sible’. An added complication for the analyst is that in some situations one
or more mechanisms of coordination may have been established formally,
but no one is participating in them and no actual coordination is occurring
in practice, so one must look beyond surface appearances.
Although coordination, cooperation, and collaboration are all used
frequently and sometimes treated as synonyms, they are not the same.
All cooperation/collaboration may be coordinative, but not all coordin-
ation is cooperative/collaborative, especially to the degree that cooperation
connotes voluntariness – one may imagine, for instance, individuals or
organizations coordinating their activities so that they can avoid each
other. Coordination is therefore a characteristic property to be found at
least to some extent in any polycentric governance situation, while cooper-
ation and collaboration, although important, will be frequently but not
necessarily present. Cooperation among centres is the focus of Chapter 5.
Coordination has a favourable connotation in many usages, but for our
purposes we are not suggesting that it is inherently or necessarily good or
efficient, fair, inclusive, etc. A cartel, for example, or a criminal syndicate
involves very high levels of coordination among the centres involved. The
effects of coordination are contingent and a matter for empirical investi-
gation. The key is for analysts to look for and identify the forms and extent
of coordination that are present in a polycentric governance situation as
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part of the attempt to understand and explain it and assess its functioning
and effects (Berardo and Scholz 2010). Berardo and Lubell (2016), and
others, emphasize the bridging and bonding capital inherent to coordin-
ation processes in polycentric governance systems and the role of risk
perception for organizing these processes. As noted briefly, these processes
may also manifest in the establishment of specific ‘boundary or bridging
organizations’ (i.e. additional centres). Cash et al. (2006) identified and
characterized such organizations as one answer to the pervasive scale and
plurality challenges playing intermediary roles in the exchange of infor-
mation among centres. It should be considered that these organizations
may have substantial independence and need to be counted as additional
centres in a governance situation with their own goals, means, and power.
Furthermore, we make a distinction between coordination processes and
whether the polycentric arrangement, as such, can be called coordinated
overall. Conflicts may in some circumstances indicate a lack of overall
coordination. As we have stated, conflicts are inherent to any governance
situation and a dynamic component, with a strong temporal dimension, so
it is relevant how conflicts arise and how they are resolved. Regularly
occurring conflicts may render institutionalized conflict-resolution pro-
cesses necessary. Conflicts resulting from dynamic processes, such as
changing needs, changing perceptions and changing contexts, may be
addressed through changes of the governance arrangements. Like compe-
tition, conflict and coordination may be endogenous drivers of change
within polycentric arrangements. Individuals experiencing the presence,
absence, extent, or effects of coordination and conflict may become motiv-
ated to create new centres or modify or eliminate existing ones, or shift
levels of action and engage in rule adaptation for purposes of trying to alter
the existence, nature, or operation of coordination in that polycentric
situation. Section 2.6 elaborates these dynamisms further, and Chapters 5–8
in Part II use empirical cases to discuss, illustrate, and compare cooper-
ation, conflict, and competition among centres.
2.6 Questions about Emergence, Transition, and Decline
 How do centres come into existence or dissolve?
 Are they able to change their organizational structures and/or their
decision-making processes and, if so, how?
 Are they able to change their functions (activities performed, services
provided, areas or constituencies served, etc.) and, if so, how?
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 How have relationships and interactions between centres changed
over time, and for what reasons?
 Do changes of centres or relationships reflect changed understandings
of scales of problems, scales of production, or scales of effects?
 Have conflicts among centres resulted in changes to the number,
composition, functions, and/or interactions of centres? If so, how
did those changes occur and with what apparent consequences?
Fundamental to understanding polycentric arrangements is the recogni-
tion that both the units (centres) and their relationships can and do
change. This is a focus of Chapter 4. These changes are not always or
necessarily exogenously driven. Individuals within polycentric governance
structures may and do generate changes. Processes of emergence, change
and decline can be captured by the concepts of design and spontaneity.
Because the centres in a polycentric structure are human creations, it is
essential to view them as deliberately created, and therefore designed, at
least, to some extent.
This does not, however, necessarily imply that a polycentric arrange-
ment composed of those centres was designed. The structure is not merely
the additive sum of the centres, but also the composite of their interactions
with one another. It is possible, and even likely, that centres have been
designed but the interactive system they comprise has not. Furthermore,
the internal dynamics of any polycentric arrangement can be expected to
change over time through the appearance or disappearance of centres and
alterations in their individual operations and in their interactions with one
another, and it is possible and even likely that these changes are also not
designed.
Scholars have used terms such as ‘spontaneity’, ‘spontaneous order’,
‘emergence’, ‘emergent structure’, etc., to try to capture and convey the
idea that even though there may be identifiable patterns in a dynamic
structure, they do not necessarily reflect or result from an act or a process
of design. It may also be the case that some aspects of polycentric arrange-
ments have been designed and others have emerged so the structure has
designed and undesigned elements. The multitude of polycentric arrange-
ments that exist in the world is better approached with a conceptual toolkit
that includes design as well as spontaneity or emergence, and where many
polycentric arrangements belong somewhere on a spectrum between being
fully designed and completely spontaneous.
Some contributors to the literature on polycentricity have argued that it
is a practical impossibility for any one person to design a structure as
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complex and dynamic as a polycentric governance system (e.g. Boettke and
Coyne 2005, 154; McGinnis 2005, 168). Polycentric arrangements are
complex, having been composed by multiple ‘designers’ who have estab-
lished centres and developed and altered their relationships over time. The
levels of action concept4 aids in understanding and explaining scope,
extent and mechanisms of endogenous change in polycentric arrange-
ments. It was presented in 1982 by Kiser and E. Ostrom (1982) and since
then has been used in many theoretical and empirical examinations of
institutions and their functioning. It is also one of the core elements of the
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, although it can
be used and applied outside of an IAD approach as well.
What centres exist, how they came into being, and how they are altered,
are functions of actions taken at a collective-choice level. Similarly, what
centres must, or may or may not, interact with other centres, and in what
ways, depend upon rules adopted at a collective-choice level. Changes that
are made at a collective-choice level feed into and shape the operational
level of action of a polycentric structure by affecting the number, types, and
functions of the centres and the manner in which they take each other into
account. The constitutional-choice level of action is also important to
understanding polycentric arrangements because decisions made at that
level determine whether and how easily people may make changes at the
collective-choice level. In communities (of whatever size) where the
constitutional-choice level of action allows wide latitude for individuals
and organizations5 to establish and alter centres and their relationships, the
dynamics of stability and change of polycentric structures can and should
be expected to differ from those that are observed and experienced in
communities with stronger constraints on institutional modification.
One seeks to understand a polycentric structure through an examination
of the centres, their functions and operations, their interactions, effects,
and adjustments over time as individual actors and organizations pursue
their aims, try to solve problems, and adapt. Any unit may fail, or may
succeed at others’ expense, or may find ways to succeed through coopera-
tive ventures that advance others’ well-being too. More likely, a polycentric
structure at any given time will include all of those experiences plus others,
4 Remember that the concept of levels of action is not the same as levels of government.
5 Remember that each level of action does not entail a different set of actors. Individuals
working at the operational level may decide to shift to collective-choice actions to modify
centres and relationships, and to constitutional-choice actions if they wish to address the
processes by which such changes may take place.
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which is another reason why polycentric arrangements change over time
even though no single designer is adjusting the structure as a whole.
2.7 Questions about Effects
 How has the governance arrangement helped or hindered efforts to
improve conditions and solve problems?
 In what ways and to what extent has this governance arrangement
facilitated information generation, learning, error correction, and
adaptation?
To this point, the inquiry has been directed toward understanding elem-
ents, context, and dynamics of the governance situation – allowing the
analyst to see it in terms of polycentricity. At this stage, the analyst may
pose questions about the governance arrangement as a whole and how to
think about the effects it generates.
Evaluating a governance arrangement differs from evaluating a particu-
lar good or service, a programme or a policy. Citing McGinnis (2011),
Koontz et al. in Chapter 8 observe, ‘Scholars of polycentricity, and govern-
ance more generally, have identified a wide range of performance criteria.’
Those authors apply multiple criteria – some emphasizing processes and
others focused on outcomes – to the cases they present in Part II. These
performance criteria are accountability, social learning, adaptability, repre-
sentation, consideration of appropriate knowledge in decision making,
network building, and coherence (both among decision centres and across
levels), in addition to the familiar evaluation criteria of efficiency and
efficacy. This combination of criteria is compatible with prior work by
Blomquist (1992), Pahl-Wostl and Knieper (2014), Pahl-Wostl (2014,
2015) and with the recommendation of Low, E. Ostrom, and Wilson
(2003, 86) that performance of management arrangements for complex
resource systems can, and should, be assessed in terms of their ability to
cope with risk, uncertainty, and exogenous shocks, reduce errors through
learning, address local as well as subsystem and system level problems, and
avoid system collapse or failure. Accordingly, the questions listed address a
myriad of effects that a governance arrangement may have.
In regard to complex systems, adaptive capacity is a vital criterion. It
connotes purposeful adjustment in light of updated information. In the
governance context, we may link it to the concept of levels of action
mentioned in Section 2.6. In a governance structure that exhibits adaptive
capacity, people would be able not only to make behavioural adjustments
Examining Governance Situations Using a Polycentricity Lens 61
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108325721.003
at the operational level in response to changed understandings, but also to
shift to the collective-choice level to alter rules governing behaviour and to
the constitutional-choice level when necessary to alter decision-making
processes. Pahl-Wostl has linked the concept to the importance of single-
loop, double-loop, and triple-loop learning as characteristics of adaptable
complex governance structures.
Adaptation by governance arrangements in response to updated infor-
mation and revised understandings depends necessarily upon both infor-
mation generation and the interpretation of information from multiple
viewpoints. Assuming that fuller information is beneficial for effective
governance, arrangements that more effectively promote the generation
of information from different levels, about various dimensions of prob-
lems, performance and about alternative practices would be preferable.
Similarly, since information admits of multiple meanings, governance
arrangements featuring diverse channels through which people can
express, exchange, and even contest about the interpretation and signifi-
cance of that information would be preferable to governance arrangements
that limit such flows.
These criteria are readily linked to another, i.e. error reduction. Human-
created structures are unavoidably error-prone to greater or lesser degree,
both in bringing about undesirable results and in failing to achieve desir-
able ones (Bendor 1985). Error elimination may be impossible, but error
reduction is nonetheless desirable and a legitimate criterion on which to
evaluate the demonstrated performance of governance systems. Whether a
governance arrangement enables or inhibits learning and contestation is
therefore an important area for inquiry.
The examination of effects of polycentric governance arrangements in
specific settings will often – perhaps always – generate mixed findings.
Naturally, some trade-offs may be identified between the openness of a
governance system to change and its robustness to maintain functions and
withstand disruption. It is worthwhile to take both into account when
evaluating governance arrangements, to consider how they are situated
between rigidity and flux. Furthermore, Milman and Scott’s (2010) cogent
assessment of trade-offs in the water-management context is valuable.
They noted that the overlap and redundancies of polycentric arrangements
may enhance resilience, but also raise transaction costs and the prospects
of conflict and confusion over authority and responsibility. Overlap among
centres may be incomplete: ‘gaps in jurisdiction’ may occur where ‘some
aspects of water management do not fall under the purview of any water
management agency’ (2010, 532). The dynamic nature of polycentric
62 William A. Blomquist and Nadine Jenny Shirin Schröder
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108325721.003
arrangements is surely an advantage in some respects, but it can also be the
case that ‘[r]apid evolution leads to ambiguity (ill-defined roles) [that] in
turn leads to legitimacy claims that can result in overlapping mandates and
program implementation working at cross purposes’ (2010, 532). Noting
both the pitfalls and the promises of polycentricity, Milman and Scott
reach a conclusion similar to that of Elinor Ostrom when she wrote ‘there
is no guarantee that such systems will find the combination of rules at
diverse levels that are optimal for any particular environment’ (E.
Ostrom 1999, 39).
2.8 Conclusion
Since polycentric governance is widespread, it is essential to have some way
of identifying and characterizing it. This is challenging, however, because
of the countless forms and variations that actual polycentric arrangements
may take and their continuous change over time. The diagnostic inquiry-
based approach laid out above therefore has many parts and steps.
However, making this effort to ‘see polycentrically’ should generate
insight into the ways in which the various aspects and dimensions of
polycentric governance manifest themselves in a complex governance
situation. What should emerge in the composite result of these inquiries
is an understanding of governance in a particular setting that helps to
indicate whether, to what extent, and in what ways it resembles a poly-
centric governance system, an uncoordinated and fragmented jumble, or
something in-between. We encourage the use and refinement of this
inquiry-based approach in future research on polycentric governance
across a variety of settings, which will enhance the accumulation of
knowledge.
Developing that kind of overall portrait of a complex governance situ-
ation, by assembling this information, is also vital to any prospect for an
accurate and empirically grounded evaluation of how the governance
arrangements perform and of the prospects for positive change. If we make
such pronouncements without undertaking the inquiry, we run the risks
not merely of failing to understand the governance arrangements, but also
of substituting ideological judgements for actual analyses – i.e. (a) dismiss-
ing as undesirable all polycentric governance situations, regardless of how
well or poorly they may actually operate, or (b) embracing as desirable all
polycentric governance situations, regardless of how well or poorly they
actually operate. Neither is the appropriate stance for committed research-
ers or practitioners.
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Other chapters in this book use empirical cases of water and other
governance situations to discuss, further illustrate and compare the elem-
ents laid out in this inquiry. How polycentric governance functions in any
actual setting depends on more than the characteristics of the governance
arrangements themselves. It also depends on the overarching rules of the
polity, the nature of the problems being addressed, and the communities in
which governance arrangements are embedded. These are the focus of
Chapter 3.
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